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Abstract
Scholars have argued for centuries that metaphors are persuasive in politics; yet,
scant experimental research exists to validate these assertions. Two experiments
about the issue of federally regulating the Internet were conducted to test whether
metaphors confer a unique persuasive advantage relative to conventional messages.
The results of these studies confirm that an apt metaphor can be a powerful tool
of persuasion. Moreover, the evidence suggests that metaphor-induced persuasion
works particularly well for politically unsophisticated citizens by increasing assess-
ments of message quality. Ultimately, this research concerns how individuals make
sense of politics, and how policymakers can use what we know about human cogni-
tion to convey their platforms to the general public.
One can resist the invasion of an
army, but one cannot resist the
invasion of ideas.
—Victor Hugo,
Histoire d’un Crime
These days Americans seem more interested in the latest celebrity breakup than
the implications of government policy. Even those individuals who are sufficiently
motivated to pay attention to politics have busy lives and perforce cannot allocate
the cognitive energy necessary to make fully informed decisions. To navigate the con-
stant stream of political information, citizens must strike a balance between adopting
strategies that will minimize effort yet obtain a desirable outcome (Fiske & Taylor,
1991). Dual process theorists call this a tradeoff between being “economy-minded”
while simultaneously being “accuracy-minded” (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986). A central ques-
tion for scholars of political communication is what type of policy information will
resonate with the average American, given what we know about their limited moti-
vation and capacity to process information about politics (e.g., see Delli Carpini &
Keeter, 1996).
To address this question, scholars have posited various theories that might ex-
plain how individuals overcome the high demand on their cognitive resources when
evaluating politics. For instance, there is compelling evidence that citizens can and
will rely upon judgemental shortcuts, or heuristics, to form their policy preferences
(Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Messages that contain low-
effort cues such as party identification (Kam, 2005; Rahn, 1993), references to elites
(Mondak, 1993) or interest group endorsements (Lupia, 1994) have been shown to
guide individuals’ political evaluations. Other scholars find that frames—central
organizing ideas or story lines—can help citizens interpret and understand the core
aspects of an issue (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006; Chong & Druckman, 2007a; Gamson
& Modigliani, 1987; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Framing effects have been
demonstrated for a wide array of issues such as civil liberties (Nelson et al., 1997),
welfare (Kinder & Sanders, 1996), and gay rights (Brewer, 2002). These theories
have helped us identify some of the ways that average citizens use information to
make their policy decisions.
Another approach worthy of exploration is the study of what Schlesinger & Lau
(2000; see also Lakoff, 1996; Lau & Schlesinger, 2005; Schon, 1979) call “policy
metaphors,” which elicit comparisons between political issues and familiar, non-
political domains of experience. Gentner (1983; see also Gentner, 1982; Gentner &
Markman, 1997) explains that metaphor-induced inferences are driven by “structure-
mapping,” in which relational similarities are highlighted between source and target
concepts.1 In other words, metaphors imply a system of relations, which should
affect how individuals think and reason about politics. As Pinker notes: “Metaphors
are not just literary garnishes but aids to reason. . . [they] can power sophisticated
inferences” (2007, p. 253).
The key for those studying political communication is that apt policy metaphors
capture the essence of a lengthy political debate and present this information in a
succinct, yet novel format. As a result, policy metaphors should be able to sway pub-
lic opinion, particularly for matters that are complex, or what Carmines & Stimson
(1980) call “hard” issues (e.g., those that are technical, means-oriented, or unfa-
miliar). To the extent that they can take difficult issues and make them easier
to comprehend, policy metaphors should also be especially effective for unsophisti-
cated citizens in society, since they have much to gain from these metaphor-induced
comparisons. In the following sections, I discuss existing research concerning the
functions of metaphors and their role in attitude formation and change. In addition,
I present the results from two experiments, in which I attempt to parse out the dis-
tinct persuasive effects of a message with a policy metaphor relative to one without
it.
1Lakoff & Johnson (1980; see also Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs, 1996) argue that all concepts are inher-
ently metaphorical and embodied in our everyday experiences.
The Functions of Metaphors
A review of the literature concerning metaphors and their usage reveals that they
serve several cognitive, affective, and communicative functions. First, as mentioned
above, metaphors are frequently used to explain abstract or complex concepts, or
what Fainsilber & Ortony (1987) call “inexpressibility.” Consider how we might use
metaphors to take a complicated concept like the meaning of life and relate it to a
more common, everyday experience. For example, the metaphor life is a journey
suggests that in life we often travel from place to place, meet new people, and
explore the world around us. This is, of course, only one of many ways of thinking
about life. Others may conceive of it with the metaphor life is a roller coaster,
in which the source, roller coaster, implies that life may be both exhilarating and
frightening, and that we often experience many “ups” and “downs”—metaphors for
positive and negative experiences—before coming to an end. Or, perhaps life is a
jungle, in which people struggle to survive in a dangerous world. No matter how
people choose to conceptualize the meaning of life, these examples underscore the
ways that metaphors can help explain abstract concepts and convey the vividness
of that experience in more concrete and familiar terms.
Second, metaphors offer the speaker a succinct and efficient way of communicat-
ing ideas (Fainsilber & Ortony, 1987). For example, a simple statement like “the
room is small” communicates a single piece of information about the subject of this
sentence. By simply replacing the adjective “small” with a noun like “dungeon,”
we have, in effect, created a metaphor. Now the sentence “the room is a dungeon”
conveys multiple pieces of information, or what Miller (1956; see also Simon, 1974)
calls “chunks” of information. Thus, we not only learn that the room is small from
the source (dungeon) but also that it is dark, dank, confining, and should be per-
ceived negatively. The efficiency gained from the use of metaphors could be quite
useful for political communication.
Third, metaphors often function as organizational frameworks to interpret in-
coming information and facilitate its recall from memory (Allbritton, 1995; Belt,
2003; Gentner, 1982; Lau & Schlesinger, 2005; Mio & Lovrich, 1998; Mio, Thomp-
son, & Givens, 1993; Read, Cesa, Jones, & Collins, 1990; Robins & Mayer, 2000;
Schlesinger & Lau, 2000). As Gentner (1983) notes, metaphors imply a system of
relations, which help people understand how different pieces of information fit to-
gether. For instance, the metaphor war on drugs tells us that those involved in
the sale of drugs are the “enemy,” and that they should be “fought” aggressively
in “battles” that can be won or lost. The ultimate goal of this metaphorical war is
“victory,” in which the supply of drugs is to be completely “annihilated.”2 Essen-
tially, this metaphor maps a familiar framework (i.e., “war”) onto the social problem
of drugs, and in doing so, helps people understand how various pieces of information
about the issue fit together.
Fourth, metaphors can be used to evoke or intensify emotions (Belt, 2003; Blanchette
& Dunbar, 2001; Gibbs, 2002; Read et al., 1990; Thagard & Shelley, 2001), which
has long been exploited by skilled writers and rhetoricians. Consider this example
from Martin Luther King, Jr.’s impassioned “I Have a Dream” speech:
Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation
to the sunlit path of racial justice; now is the time to lift our nation from
the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood ; now
is the time to make justice a reality for all God’s children (August 28,
1963).
Here, King invokes source domains that have strong affective implications (e.g.,
“dark,” and “quicksand” are prototypically negative; “rise,” “sunlit,” and “lift” have
positive connotations). One clear advantage of using affective metaphors is that a
growing body of research demonstrates that emotion is central to decisionmaking
2Note that a demand-side metaphor like drug use is an illness has different implications for how
to address the problem in society, namely drug-users should treated like patients suffering from an
illness.
and behavior (e.g., see Marcus, 2000). Moreover, affect has been shown to operate
through dual routes to persuasion (Petty & Wegener, 1999), functioning heuristically
in some instances (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007) and systematically
in others (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000).
And finally, metaphors that consist of novel juxtapositions and vivid language
tend to stand out in verbal and written communications. As a result, these metaphors
draw attention to the message and its contents, increasing the likelihood that they
will influence attitudes, as well as ratings of the speaker and message itself (e.g.,
see Ottati, Rhoads, & Graesser, 1999; Read et al., 1990). This is no small feat, as
speakers often vie for the public’s attention in this age of information overload.3
Metaphors and Political Persuasion
There is some evidence that exposure to a metaphor can affect political atti-
tudes. For instance, Lau & Schlesinger (2005) find that policy metaphors related
to former President Clinton’s healthcare plan significantly influenced public sup-
port for health-related issues (i.e., treating substance abuse and providing long-term
care to the disabled and elderly) and even affected two unrelated social domains
(i.e., affordable housing and public education). Similarly, Robins & Mayer (2000)
demonstrated that exposure to a short vignette about international trade—either in-
voking the metaphor trade is war or trade is a two-way street—persuaded subjects
to support the metaphor-consistent policy solution. And, Bosman (1987) showed
that attitudes toward right-wing Dutch political parties were influenced by exposing
subjects to passages containing different metaphors (e.g., “we have to pull off this
party’s mask”).
One major limitation of these studies is that they do not directly address the
question of whether “it is the distinctively metaphorical aspects of understanding
3It may also be worth noting that metaphors can be used to obscure thinking as Orwell (1947)
argued in his essay “Politics and the English Language.”
that shape policy attitudes, as opposed to more general framing effects” (Lau &
Schlesinger, 2005; p.106). As subjects were only exposed to messages with competing
metaphors (and not similarly-worded, but non-metaphorical control conditions), it
is impossible to test whether metaphors provided any persuasive advantage over
standard language. As a result, one could argue that the policy metaphors used by
Lau & Schlesinger (2005), Robins & Mayer (2000), and Bosman (1987) are simply
cognitive schema or frames that have been studied extensively in psychology (e.g.,
see Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
There are, however, a few studies that pit metaphorical messages against literal
comparison statements. For instance, Bosman & Hagendoorn (1991) measured at-
titudes toward an extreme Dutch political party after exposing some subjects to a
passage containing metaphorical messages (e.g., “the Center Party is the fruit born
of an ill society” compared to others who read literal counterparts such as “the Cen-
ter Party was caused by a malfunctioning society”). Yet, Bosman & Hagendoorn
find no support for the persuasiveness of metaphor relative to conventional language;
instead, they report directional evidence that metaphors were less persuasive than
literally-worded passages. But we should interpret these findings with caution, since
they concern attitudes toward a political party, rather than a specific issue. One
could make the case that a party is a relatively easy object to evaluate—it is familiar
and non-technical to use Carmines & Stimson’s (1980) issue-difficulty criteria. In
this case, it is likely that subjects already have knowledge of and strong attitudes
toward the pro-Nazi party used in this study. Consequently, this might explain why
the metaphor did not shift subjects’ attitudes relative to those in the literal control
condition.
Unlike Bosman & Hagendoorn, Bowers & Osborn (1966) find support for the
supremacy of metaphor over conventional language. In one of the earliest recorded
experimental studies of metaphor-based persuasion, they had subjects listen to a
speech that either concluded with a metaphor or literal passage and then report their
attitudes toward two political issues. One speech provided an argument against spe-
cial interest groups’ desire to impose protective tariffs by invoking various metaphors
related to the domain of sex (e.g., “rape of western economies,” “prostituted our own
interests,” and “economic abortion”). The other speech opposing government aid to
needy students instantiated death metaphors like “slowly strangle our own individ-
uality,” “death of freedom,” and “gentle murder of our values.” Bowers & Osborn
demonstrate that subjects exposed to these policy metaphors experienced signifi-
cantly greater attitude change than those subjects exposed to literal versions of the
same speeches.
To reconcile these findings, Sopory & Dillard (2002) conducted a meta-analysis
of 12 published articles4 with designs that contained a wide array of metaphors,
attitude objects, and experimental designs (it should be noted that few of the studies
actually concerned political attitudes). They report a small, but significant mean
effect size for the hypothesis that metaphors are more persuasive than comparable
literal statements (r = .07; N = 2, 344; k = 16 studies).5 Sopory & Dillard also
note that the effect size of metaphorical persuasion could be as large as r = 0.42
under optimal settings (based upon the novelty of the metaphor, its location in the
message, and the familiarity of the target object).
These studies are encouraging and suggest that it is essential to carefully control
wording between metaphor and control conditions to parse out the unique effects
attributable only to the policy metaphor. With such a design, I should be able to
contribute to the current debate and test my key hypothesis. I expect a persuasive
message with a policy metaphor should produce greater attitude change than the same
message with a similarly-worded literal statement.
In addition, I propose a more nuanced hypothesis concerning which citizens
4The meta-analysis also included 12 unpublished works (largely from doctoral dissertations
and master’s theses), which would brings the total number of experiments on metaphor-induced
persuasion to 29. However, given that these unpublished studies were not subjected to peer-review,
I opted to exclude them from my discussion.
5For each study, Sopory & Dillard (2002) estimated effect sizes (r) based upon cell-to-cell
comparisons calculated from the reported (t) or (F ) statistics.
will likely benefit from an apt policy metaphor. Attitude theorists dating back
to McGuire (1968, 1985) have considered message comprehension as a crucial com-
ponent of persuasion. In number of studies, scholars show that people are unlikely
to change their attitudes when they have difficulty comprehending the arguments
contained within a persuasive message. One important determinant of message
comprehension is issue difficulty—that is, how “easy” or “hard” an issue is to grasp
(Carmines & Stimson, 1980). Easy issues tend to be symbolic, outcome-oriented,
or familiar; thus, they should require less conceptual sophistication to comprehend
than hard issues that tend to be technical, means-oriented, or unfamiliar.
When an issue is relatively easy to comprehend, citizens at all levels of political
sophistication should understand the key arguments contained within a persuasive
message, regardless of whether that message invokes a policy metaphor. For hard
issues, however, citizens at low to moderate levels of political sophistication should
have difficulty grasping conventional (i.e., literal) arguments without the aid of a
policy metaphor and thus remain unpersuaded by the message. In this case, an apt
policy metaphor should help these citizens comprehend and process information con-
tained within a persuasive message, thereby producing attitude change. Of course,
citizens that are politically sophisticated should be able to understand even the
most difficult issue arguments; therefore, they should not need the policy metaphor
to inform their issue attitudes. In other words, I expect political sophistication to
moderate the effects of a policy metaphor on political attitudes for “hard” issues,
such that the difference in persuasion between metaphor and control conditions is
greatest for unsophisticated citizens.
Unfortunately, there is little consensus from existing empirical research concern-
ing my political sophistication hypothesis. For instance, Johnson & Taylor (1981)
discovered that only politically sophisticated subjects were influenced by metaphors.
They argue that one explanation is that only sophisticated subjects have ability to
integrate new information from the metaphor into their existing knowledge struc-
tures. Yet, Robins & Mayer (2000) demonstrate just the opposite, namely that
persuasion occurs only for the least knowledgeable subjects because they have the
most to gain from the novel connections created by the metaphor. And, Lau &
Schlesinger (2005; see also Schlesinger & Lau, 2000) find that the effects of the
health-related metaphor held for citizens at all levels of political knowledge, sug-
gesting that metaphors may provide enough novel insight into a problem to benefit
political sophisticates, as well as the average, low-information citizen.
One potential mechanism through which metaphors may operate is message qual-
ity. Because they can explain abstract concepts in more familiar terms and experi-
ences, metaphors should be judged as making qualitatively better arguments than
their literal counterparts. This is important, since Lavine & Snyder (1996; see also
Lavine, Burgess, Snyder, Transue, Sullivan, Haney, & Wagner, 1999; Read et al.,
1990) have shown that subjective ratings of message quality represent one mediator
of message type on political attitudes. Thus, I hypothesize that policy metaphors
should increase perceptions of message quality, which in turn, facilitate attitude
change. Of course, this is only one of several potential mechanisms facilitating
political persuasion. For instance, Schlesinger & Lau (2000) argue that metaphors
may evoke emotional responses in individuals, which then can be used as a likeability
heuristic (Sniderman et al., 1991) among those lacking political sophistication.
Study 1
Subjects read an article about the issue of network (net) neutrality, which con-
cerns how information is priced and transmitted over the Internet. As web companies
have begun offering higher quality audio, video, and voice data, broadband service
providers have responded to the increased demand by lobbying Congress for permis-
sion to establish a tiered system of content delivery. Their plan involves charging
consumers a premium to ensure that only data that are paid for is transmitted at the
highest possible speed to offset the increased costs associated with this data-intensive
information. Proponents of net neutrality argue that this tiered system violates the
“neutrality” principle of the Internet—that is, the principle that the Internet was
originally created to treat all data packets equally, regardless of their type. They
want Congress to pass legislation that would prohibit broadband carriers from us-
ing their market power to discriminate against competing applications or content.
Opponents argue that broadband service providers have every right to impose new
fees to pay for the maintenance and expansion of their high-speed networks.
I chose the issue of net neutrality for a few important reasons. First, net neu-
trality is a real political issue, the debate of which has generated huge lobbying
efforts, pitting large broadband service providers like AT&T, Verizon, and AOL
Time Warner against web giants like Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft. In addition,
parties on both sides of the issue have invoked a number of different metaphors to
sell their position to the public. The fact that this is a real issue debated before
Congress helps to increase external validity. As Bill Moyers notes: “The debate is
hot, the language heady, the metaphors many.”
Second, despite receiving a great deal of media attention, as well as concerted
grassroots efforts to publicize the issue (e.g., the “Save the Internet” campaign),
net neutrality remains largely unknown to the general public. In 2006, a nationally
representative survey of 800 American adults revealed that only 7 percent of respon-
dents had ever heard or seen anything about the issue.6 The unfamiliarity of net
neutrality seems to satisfy one criterion of a “hard” issue according to Carmines &
Stimson (1980).
Finally, net neutrality is somewhat complicated because it involves understanding
how telecommunications are structured in this country. In addition, citizens have to
reconcile the role that the federal government might play in regulating the Internet.
As Peha, Lehr, & Wilkie (2007) note: “The technical complexity of controversies like
6The bi-partisan survey was conducted by the Glover Park Group and Public Opinion Strategies
in September 2006.
network neutrality make it difficult for policymakers to define and frame the issue,
much less identify an appropriate solution that reconciles the conflicting interests”
(p. 710).
Of course, one major drawback of using this issue is that the ultimate decision is a
binary choice—that is, individuals either support or oppose net neutrality legislation.
A simple decision in this case reduces the demand on individuals’ cognitive resources.
One can imagine that policy areas like healthcare or education would greatly increase
the cognitive complexity facing citizens because of the need to keep track of and
understand multiple, competing proposals. For such issues, individuals—especially
those lacking political sophistication—would be forced to find ways to reduce the
heavy cognitive burden of making decisions. Yet, given its technical and unfamiliar
nature, net neutrality should still put it closer to the “hard” end of the issue difficulty
spectrum, which presents a unique opportunity to test the persuasive effects of
metaphors in a real policy debate.
Data
A total of 131 undergraduates enrolled in an introductory political science course
at Stony Brook University completed this study for extra credit during the spring
of 2008. Fifty-two percent of subjects were male, and 53% of participants identified
their ethnicity as “White,” 31% as “Asian,” 10% as “Latino,” and 6% as “African
American.” Forty-one percent of subjects identified themselves as Democrats, 20%
as Republican, 31% as Independent, and 8% as other affiliations. Using a 7-point
measure of ideological orientation reveals that 50% of the sample holds liberal views,
27% moderate views, and 23% conservative views. Eighty-eight percent of subjects
reported never having heard of network neutrality, and of those that did hear about
it, only 12% reported that they were ”very knowledgeable” about the issue, which
again suggests that this issue fulfills Carmines & Stimson’s (1980) definition of a
“hard” issue.
Experimental Manipulation
Subjects were asked to read a 1-page article about net neutrality. The first
three paragraphs explained the current debate surrounding the issue (see Table 1
for the exact wording), while the last paragraph contained the experimental manipu-
lation. Subjects were exposed to either a concluding passage that contained a policy
metaphor (n = 63) or a non-metaphorical (literal) equivalent message (n = 68) in
support of net neutrality. The metaphor condition (72 words) invoked a toll booth
metaphor (identified in italics) and read as follows:
Congressman Alan Davidson, who specializes in technology issues, sup-
ports Network Neutrality legislation. He recently told reporters: “Tele-
coms want to set up toll booths on the Internet to stand between content
providers and their customers. Network Neutrality would prevent this
from happening. It would ensure that we don’t have a system where
some companies have access to an express lane, while the rest are stuck
waiting in line at the toll booth.”
The toll booth metaphor was chosen for several important reasons. First, toll booths
are generally familiar and activate negative associations for those that have experi-
enced them. Second, the toll booth metaphor maps well onto the existing metaphors
of the Internet as an information superhighway. And finally, this policy metaphor
has actually been used by net neutrality advocates (e.g., see “Save the Internet”;
see also Moyers, n.d.), which bolsters the external validity of this experiment.
The literal message (64 words) used similar language without invoking a toll
booth metaphor (differences between conditions are identified in bold):
Congressman Alan Davidson, who specializes in technology issues, sup-
ports Network Neutrality legislation. He recently told reporters: “Tele-
coms want to charge fees on the Internet to connect content providers
to their customers. Network Neutrality would prevent this from happen-
ing. It would ensure that we don’t have a system where some companies
have access to fast services, while the rest are left with slower con-
nections.”
In this equivalent (non-metaphorical) message, the speaker argues that network neu-
trality would prevent telecoms from imposing special fees on the Internet and protect
users from a two-tiered system. Note again that the only discernible difference be-
tween the two conditions is that the equivalent message does not invoke the policy
metaphor. The experimental manipulation is dummy coded for the analyses so that
a value of 1 represents exposure to the policy metaphor and 0 means exposure to
the literal equivalent.
Measures
Policy attitude. The primary dependent variable is a 4- item semantic differential
scale that was created to gauge subjects’ attitudes toward net neutrality. Subjects
were asked: “How favorable or unfavorable do you feel toward Network Neutral-
ity legislation?” The three remaining scale items were anchored by the following
endpoints: “very good idea–very bad idea,” “very necessary–very unnecessary,” and
“very positive–very negative.” Each item was measured on a 9-point scale, which
created a composite index that could range from 4 (very negative attitudes toward
network neutrality) to 36 (very positive attitudes). The resulting variable was then
rescaled from 0 to 1 (α = 0.93, M = 0.58, SD = 0.23).
Political sophistication. Political sophistication was measured using 8 general
knowledge questions about politics.7 The 8-item political sophistication measure
(KR-20 = 0.71, M = 0.62, SD = 0.26) was recoded from 0 to 1 and mean-centered.
Control variables. Respondents that are knowledgeable about the issue or com-
puters may hold different attitudes toward net neutrality than their less technologi-
cally savvy counterparts. Issue familiarity is dummy coded so that respondents who
7The exact wording for these items are as follows (correct responses are indicated in italics;
frequencies of correct answers are in parentheses): 1) Whose responsibility is it to determine if a
law is constitutional or not? Supreme Court (79%); 2) Which party currently has the most elected
members in the U.S. House of Representatives? Democratic Party (62%); 3) What job does Harry
Reid currently hold? Senate Majority Leader (35%); 4) How much of a majority of the both the
House of Representatives and Senate are required to override a presidential veto? 2/3 (63%); 5)
Which one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? Republican
Party (79%); 6) How many justices are there on the U.S. Supreme Court? 9 (53%); 7) What
job does Condoleezza Rice currently hold? Secretary of State (82%); and 8) Which branch of
government does the U.S. Constitution give the sole authority to declare war Legislative Branch
(44%).
reported ever having heard of the issue receive a value of 1, while the rest serve as
the reference group. Level of computer expertise (1 = expert, 0 = beginner) and
interest in computers (1 = very interested, 0 = not at all interested) are 4-point mea-
sures, recoded from 0 to 1, and mean- centered. Party identification and ideological
orientation are also included in the analyses, as one would expect Republicans and
conservatives to oppose net neutrality because this legislation essentially calls for
greater government oversight and regulation. Party identification is the standard 7-
point measure used by the ANES, recoded to a 0 to 1 scale (1 = strong Democrats,
0 = strong Republicans), and mean-centered. Similarly, ideological orientation is
the 7-point ANES measure, recoded from 0 to 1 (1 = very liberal, 0 = very con-
servative), and mean-centered. Gender is coded as a dummy variable, where males
serve as the reference category. Finally, the ethnic diversity of subjects allows us to
include an additional control for race, which is dummy coded so that Whites serve
as the reference category.
Results
To test whether a message with a policy metaphor is more persuasive than one
with a literal statement, I regressed policy attitudes toward net neutrality on the
experimental manipulation variable, as well as political sophistication and the con-
trol variables described above. Looking at Model I in Table 2, we see that there is a
significant main effect for interest in computers, such that moving from the lowest
to highest level of interest increases support for network neutrality by 19% of the
scale. In addition, there are marginally significant effects for party identification, for
which moving from strong Republican to Democrat increases support by 16% of the
scale, and race, which decreases support by 8% of the scale for non-Whites. Con-
trary to my first hypothesis, there is no main effect for the experimental condition,
β = 0.004, s.e. = 0.041, n.s., which means that exposure to a policy metaphor did
not cause greater attitude change relative to the literal message.
Recall, however, that I also hypothesized that political sophistication may moder-
ate the effects of the metaphor on policy attitudes for hard issues like net neutrality.
I suggested that unsophisticated citizens may have difficulty understanding compli-
cated issues and would benefit from the novel connections made by a metaphor. By
implication, political sophisticates should have the ability to comprehend the con-
ventional (i.e., non-metaphorical) persuasive appeal; thus, they would be persuaded
to support the issue whether it was couched in metaphorical or literal language.
To test this moderation hypothesis, I added an interaction term to the model be-
tween the experimental condition and political sophistication. Turning to Model II
(Table 2), we first see that there is significant main effect for political sophistication,
β = 0.264, s.e. = 0.105, p < 0.05. More importantly, I find support for the mod-
eration hypothesis with a significant two-way interaction between the experimental
condition and political sophistication, β = −0.333, s.e. = 0.156, p < 0.05.
One way to explicate these results is to watch how the coefficient for the ex-
perimental treatment variable changes when the model is re-estimated centering
sophistication at low, moderate, and high levels (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). Because
the experimental condition variable is a dummy variable, we can interpret its coef-
ficient as a mean difference–that is, policy attitudes for the metaphor minus literal
message condition at different levels of sophistication (when all control variables
are held at 0, which is their mean or reference categories). At the lowest levels of
sophistication, the coefficient for the experimental condition variable is β = 0.211,
s.e. = 0.106, p < 0.05, which means that exposure to the metaphor (relative to the
literal equivalent) increases support by 21% of the scale. At mean levels of sophis-
tication, however, the coefficient for the experimental condition is essentially zero,
β = 0.006, s.e. = 0.040, n.s., which means that there is no persuasive advantage
of using the metaphor. And, at the highest levels of sophistication, the coefficient
reverses and is marginally significant, β = −0.121, s.e. = 0.071, p < 0.10, which sug-
gests that exposure to the literal—not metaphor-based—message increases support
by 12% of the scale.
Figure 1 shows predicted policy support and provides a clear picture of the effects
of the metaphor at different levels of sophistication.8 Essentially, it looks as though
the policy metaphor has a relatively consistent effect on political attitudes for in-
dividuals at all levels of sophistication—that is, predicted levels of support for the
policy hover around 0.60 (yˆlow = 0.64, yˆmean = 0.60, yˆhigh = 0.57, for low, mean, and
high sophistication, respectively). This finding is consistent with Lau & Schlesinger’s
(2005) previous research on policy metaphors. What varies wildly, however, is pre-
dicted support for those exposed to the conventional message—policy support ranges
from 0.43 for unsophisticated citizens to 0.70 for political sophisticates. These re-
sults suggest that the metaphor-based persuasive appeal has its greatest benefit for
unsophisticated citizens, increasing their support of net neutrality by nearly 50%
relative to the conventional message.
Discussion
The results of this study are an important first step to demonstrate that a policy
metaphor confers a distinct persuasive advantage relative to a comparable literal
statement. I find that politically unsophisticated citizens are significantly more likely
to support the policy after exposure to a metaphor compared to a literal equivalent.
This finding is quite encouraging, given that other theories of how average citizens
make sense of politics often find that it is the most sophisticated individuals who
are able to correctly utilize heuristics (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001) or frames (Chong &
Druckman, 2007b).
In addition, it is worth considering why political sophisticates in the sample ap-
pear to be more persuaded by the literal message than the one containing the policy
metaphor. One explanation is that the toll booth metaphor that I chose did not fit
8Predicted values were calculated by holding all other variables constant at their mean values
or reference categories.
well with they way more sophisticated individuals would naturally conceive of the
issue (Dunbar, 2001). Another alternative is that sophisticates quickly recognized
the policy metaphor as an overt persuasive appeal and resisted it on those grounds.
Finally, if the metaphor created strong negative associations for subjects, then un-
sophisticated subjects (but not sophisticates) may have relied upon a likeability
heuristic in their decisionmaking process.
Of course, the results of this study come from a single student sample, which
limits the generalizability of these metaphor-induced effects. To address this concern,
I test my hypotheses with a similar experimental design using an adult sample in
Study 2. In addition, I also explore one potential process by which these persuasion
effects occur. More specifically, I test whether policy metaphors elevate perceptions
of message quality, which in turn, facilitate attitude change.
Study 2
Adult subjects read the same 1-page article containing information about the
issue of net neutrality. The article included the primary manipulation, which was
determined by exposure to 1 of 3 message conditions: A metaphor (n = 44), literal
(n = 40), or background-only (n = 57) passage.9 Following the passage, subjects
completed a questionnaire that measured their attitudes toward net neutrality, as
well as their general political knowledge and other demographic information.
Data
A total of 141 adults completed this study on the Internet for a chance to win
a $50 gift certificate to Amazon.com. Respondents were recruited following the
9The wording of the metaphor and literal conditions varied only slightly from Study 1 with the
most notable difference being the addition of one line. For the metaphor-based message, the last
line read: “I don’t know about you, but I don’t like the idea of having toll booths at every on-ramp
on the information superhighway.” In contrast, the last line of the literal comparison read: “I don’t
know about you, but I don’t like the idea of having special fees imposed on content providers
on the Internet.”
Socially-Mediated Internet Surveys (SMIS) approach (Cassese, Huddy, Hartman,
Mason, & Weber, 2011, April), which uses social networking to recruit study par-
ticipants. As part of the SMIS approach, I had several research assistants act as
social mediators by sending invitations to non-student adults in their contact lists
and endorsing the study. In addition, study participants were also encouraged to
forward the study on to other individuals so that the adult convenience sample was
essentially recruited based upon snowball sampling methods.
Subjects reported living in 18 U.S. states—a majority (65%) are from California,
and the second most populous group (13%) are from New York. The mean age of
subjects is just under 44 years old. Eighty-four percent of respondents identified
their ethnicity as “White,” 10% as “Asian,” 4% as “Latino,” and 2% as “African
American.” Once again, there are more Democrats (48%) than Republicans (28%),
Independents (16%), or those with other political affiliations (8%). The sample also
consists of more liberals (46%) than conservatives (33%) or moderates (21%). There
are many more female (67%) than male (33%) participants, and a majority (60%)
of subjects indicated that they held at least a bachelor’s degree. As expected, only
a small group of subjects (14%) reported of ever having heard of net neutrality.
Measures
Policy attitude. The primary dependent variable is a 2- item semantic differential
scale that was created to gauge subjects’ attitudes toward net neutrality. Subjects
were asked: “Overall, do you think Network Neutrality is a good idea or a bad idea?”
The other scale item asked whether subjects thought that network neutrality was
“very necessary” or “very unnecessary.” Each item was measured on a 9-point scale,
which created a composite index that could range from 2 (very negative attitudes
toward net neutrality) to 18 (very positive attitudes). The resulting variable was
then rescaled from 0 to 1 (α = 0.89, M = 0.55, SD = 0.29).
Message quality. Message quality is a 2-item semantic differential scale. Subjects
rated “how convincing or unconvincing” and “how clear or unclear” they thought
the speaker’s argument was in favor of net neutrality. Note that these items were in-
tended to tap a dimension of quality related to comprehension as defined by McGuire
(1968, 1985). The 9-point items were summed to create an index that ranged from
2 (very poor message quality) to 18 (very high message quality), which was then
rescaled from 0 to 1 (α = 0.80, M = 0.57, SD = 0.24).
Independent variables. The same set of independent variables and coding scheme
were used from Study 1.10 In addition, a measure of education is included in the
models, since there is variation on this item in the adult sample. Education is a 5-
point self-reported measure, in which low values indicate little or no schooling (i.e.,
less than a high school diploma) and high values identify those subjects who hold
advanced degrees. Education has been recoded from 0 to 1 and mean-centered.
Results
To test the general persuasiveness of a policy metaphor relative to a literal equiv-
alent and baseline (control) condition, I regressed attitudes toward net neutrality on
the 2 experimental condition dummy variables (the metaphor condition serves as the
reference category), as well as political sophistication and a set of control variables.
Looking at Model I in Table 3, I find that there are marginally significant main
effects for political sophistication and issue familiarity, both of which increase an in-
dividual’s support for the policy by 15% of the scale. More importantly, I find strong
evidence that a metaphor is more persuasive than a literal equivalent, β = −0.140,
s.e. = 0.064, p < 0.05, or baseline (control) condition, β = −0.163, s.e. = 0.059,
p < 0.01.11 Substantively speaking, exposure to the metaphor increases support
10Given that political sophistication is central to one of the hypotheses, I provide the summary
statistics for this measure: KR-20 = 0.70, M = 0.60, SD = 0.29. The exact same items from
Study 1 were used in this index, with the following frequencies of correct responses: 1) 79%, 2)
62%, 3) 35%, 4) 63%, 5) 79%, 6) 53%, 7) 82%, and 8) 44%.
11The coefficient is negative in this case because the metaphor condition serves as the reference
category.
for the policy relative the literal equivalent by 14% of the scale. Moreover, after
recoding the literal condition as the reference category and rerunning the models, I
find that the message containing the conventional persuasive appeal is completely
ineffectual relative to the baseline condition, β = −0.030, s.e. = 0.060, n.s.
To explicate these results further, I plotted predicted policy support by exper-
imental condition in Figure 2. Beginning with the control condition, we see that
participants’ predicted support for network neutrality is a modest 0.44 on a scale
from 0 to 1. Individuals who were exposed to the comparable literal statement in
favor of network neutrality show no effects of persuasion, as their predicted support
is 0.47, a non-significant difference of 0.03 from the control condition. In stark con-
trast, for those subjects exposed to the metaphor, support of the policy increases to a
predicted value of 0.61, which is nearly 40% higher than the control condition. Note
that this is consistent with the findings from Study 1, in which metaphor-induced
policy support ranged from 0.64 for the unsophisticated citizens to 0.57 for political
sophisticates.
Interestingly, I find no support for the moderation hypothesis, in which political
sophistication would influence this persuasion effect. Both of the treatment dummy
variables and their interactions are not statistically significant: Literal condition X
sophistication, β = −0.141, s.e. = 0.215, n.s.; control X sophistication, β = −0.183,
s.e. = 0.198, n.s. The failure to find an interaction effect suggests that the metaphor
influenced policy attitudes for subjects at all levels of political sophistication; yet,
unlike Study 1, even sophisticates did not respond well to the literal message.
Now let us turn our attention to one potential mediator of this metaphor-induced
attitude change, namely subjective perceptions of message quality. Recall that use of
a policy metaphor should heighten ratings of message quality because the metaphor
aids in comprehension and reasoning. As a result of this function, message quality
should mediate the effects of experimental condition (metaphor vs. conventional or
control message) on policy attitudes. To test this mediational hypothesis (see Baron
& Kenny, 1986), I reran Model I (Table 3) omitting the baseline condition because
there were no arguments for participants to rate. On this reduced sample, I still find
that a policy metaphor is more persuasive than a literal equivalent (β = −0.151,
s.e. = 0.070, p < 0.05), which satisfies the first criterion of mediation. Next, I
regressed the mediating variable—perceptions of message quality—on the experi-
mental condition dummy variable and a set of controls (see Model II, Table 3). I
find that exposure to a policy metaphor significantly predicts perceptions of message
quality relative to a literal equivalent, β = −0.137, s.e. = 0.057, p < 0.05, which
satisfies the second mediation criterion. Finally, I regressed attitudes toward net
neutrality on the policy metaphor, message quality, and a set of controls (see Model
III, Table 3).
In an equation with the mediator and experimental condition variable, the ef-
fects of the policy metaphor are no longer statistically significant, β = −0.036,
s.e. = 0.053, n.s. In contrast, message quality significantly predicts levels of policy
support, β = 0.840, s.e. = 0.107, p < 0.001. These results satisfy Baron & Kenny’s
(1986) final mediation criterion. In fact, the message quality mediator accounts for a
whopping 76% of the total effect, Sobel statistic = −0.115, p < 0.05, which suggests
that increased ratings of message quality is at least one important process through
which metaphors may facilitate political persuasion.
Discussion
The results from this study confirm my first hypothesis, namely that a policy
metaphor is more persuasive than a literal equivalent. In fact, I demonstrated that
exposure to the metaphor increased support for net neutrality legislation by 30%
to 40% relative to conventional messages. One way in which this persuasion occurs
is by heightening perceptions of message quality, although admittedly I can only
speculate about the exact cause of this specific process (e.g., ease of comprehen-
sion, higher quality argument, etc.). Unlike in Study 1, however, the persuasive
advantage of metaphor over literal messages does not appear to be moderated by
political sophistication; instead, adults at all levels of sophistication accepted the
policy metaphor and rejected the conventional message.
The inconsistent results for political sophistication could be attributed to differ-
ences in the samples. To test this possibility, I pooled respondents from the two
studies and conducted several difference of means tests for levels of political sophis-
tication, interest in computers, and computer expertise.12 Looking at the results,
there appear to be no major differences in political sophistication between samples,
t(270) = 0.44, n.s.
Two alternative explanations to consider, which also map onto key dimensions
of information-processing models are motivation and ability to carefully scrutinize
message arguments (e.g., see Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). First, it
is possible that participants in Study 2 were more motivated, and thus, more likely to
draw inferences from the policy metaphor than subjects in Study 1 (e.g., see Ottati
et al., 1999). Data from the pooled results seem to refute this possibility, since I fail
to find a statistically significant difference in reported levels of interest in computers
between the adult (M = 0.73) and student samples (M = 0.68), t(269) = 1.39, n.s.
Second, it is possible that students in Study 1 were more comfortable with
technology-related issues, and thus were more likely to rate themselves as experts
than the older adult sample in Study 2. In other words, students may have been
more capable of understanding the core arguments about the issue of net neutrality.
consequently, adults may have had more to gain from an apt metaphor than the
more technologically savvy students. There is some evidence that this may be the
case, as I find a statistically significant mean difference in expertise, t(270) = 2.51,
p < 0.05, such that those in the student sample (M = 0.47) rated themselves 21%
higher in terms of expertise than those in the adult sample (M = 0.39). These find-
ings suggest that adults may been but less knowledgeable about technology-related
12For difference of means tests, all variables were recoded to range from 0 to 1, so that the results
could be meaningfully interpreted.
issues (as measured by computer expertise) than their younger counterparts.13 As a
result, the toll booth metaphor may have afforded adults with novel mappings that
may have already been apparent to subjects in the student sample.
General Discussion
In two experiments, I demonstrated that a toll booth metaphor significantly in-
creased support for net neutrality legislation relative to a similarly-worded literal
message. In Study 1, this persuasive effect was moderated by political sophistica-
tion, such that unsophisticated individuals significantly benefited from the policy
metaphor, while those at moderate to high levels of sophistication did not. For
the adult sample in Study 2, the toll booth metaphor was more persuasive than
the conventional message, regardless of an individual’s level of sophistication. I
also demonstrated one process through which policy metaphors influenced political
attitudes, namely by increasing subjective perceptions of message quality, although
admittedly this measure only indirectly captures understanding and reasoning about
politics. Taken together, these studies show that the policy metaphor had a con-
sistently strong effect on political attitudes, while the conventional messages often
failed to persuade.
There are several ways to replicate and extend this work on policy metaphors.
First, future research should include direct measures of comprehension and try to
follow the decisionmaking process, so that we can better explain metaphor-induced
persuasion. Scholars may even want to allow participants to construct their own
metaphors, which Dunbar (2001; see also Pinker, 2007) argues can be a power-
fully persuasive device (rather than simply imposing the experimenter’s preferred
metaphor on subjects in the lab).
13Models in which policy attitudes were regressed on interactions of the experimental condition
variable with computer expertise or interest were not statistically significant, regardless of whether
I used the pooled data or considered each study individually.
Second, although I focused on the cognitive implications of metaphor-based per-
suasion, it is possible that the toll booth metaphor operated through affective pro-
cesses. For example, Schlesinger & Lau (2000) argue that metaphors may evoke
emotional responses, which can be used in the same way as the likeability heuristic
(Sniderman et al., 1991) among those lacking political sophistication. As anecdotal
evidence and research demonstrate (Belt, 2003; Blanchette & Dunbar, 2001; Gibbs,
2002; Read et al., 1990; Thagard & Shelley, 2001; Weston, 2007), speakers often use
policy metaphors to evoke an emotional response in their audience, which we know
affects attitudes and behavior (Marcus, 2000). Researchers could explore differ-
ences in cognitive and affective functions of metaphors by including measures that
would capture potential affective (e.g., discrete emotional reactions) mediators of
persuasion. Likewise, scholars interested in these differences could vary the types of
metaphors used in persuasive messages to tap either cognitive or affective functions.
Third, it is not entirely clear whether my findings are driven by increased levels
of motivation or ability (or both) after exposure to a policy metaphor. For instance,
Ottati et al. (1999) demonstrate that a sports metaphor can motivate systematic
message processing for individuals that enjoy sports. If this finding is replicated, re-
searchers should consider exploring the implications of metaphor-induced systematic
processing because it should generate attitudes that are stronger than those formed
via heuristic routes to persuasion. Measures of attitude strength could be included
in future studies, and designs could be undertaken that will test other aspects of
attitude strength. For instance, researchers could employ panel designs to test dif-
ferences in stability for those attitudes generated from metaphors versus those from
comparable literal messages. Or, subjects could be exposed to counterarguments
after answering attitude items to determine the resistance of such metaphor-based
attitudes.
Fourth, future studies should test the effectiveness of metaphors for a broad range
of issues that vary on their level of complexity, while paying special attention to
finding strong comparable literal statements. The issue difficulty dimension should
help flush out any effects due to ability (i.e., political sophistication) or motivation.
This could be done by choosing issues that vary in their conceptual difficulty (i.e.,
“easy” vs. “hard” issues) or by manipulating the comprehensibility of information
concerning a specific issue.
Finally, studies that can validate the persuasiveness of metaphors in realistic
settings that expose individuals to competing metaphors or literal messages are
needed. This is the direction that current research in framing has moved, although it
is unclear whether different combinations of metaphoric versus literal messages would
result in the same null results reported in many counterframing studies (e.g., Chong
& Druckman, 2007b). Yet, Read et al. (1990) have suggested that since “a metaphor
often conveys its message by implication, it may be harder to counterargue” (p.
145). One way to test this possibility would be to pit competing messages against
one another (e.g., metaphor vs. literal, metaphor vs. metaphor, etc.).
Ultimately, I agree with cognitive scientists who argue that metaphors are more
than fancy rhetoric (Gibbs, 1994, 1996; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Pinker, 1997, 2007).
Rather than relegating them exclusively to the realm of poetry, plays, and prose, we
should recognize that metaphors are fundamental to human thought (Gibbs, 1994,
1996; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Pinker, 1997). More specifically, I see a metaphor’s
ability to explain abstract concepts in more familiar domains of experience as one
that allows public discourse to occur in one, not two different languages (Sniderman,
1993). In short, citizens that typically lack political sophistication can be brought
back into the debate with an apt policy metaphor.
Figure 1: Study 1 Predicted Levels of Policy Support, by Condition and Sophistica-
tion
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Note: N = 129. Predicted values were calculated by holding control variables constant at 0 (i.e.,
each variable’s mean value or reference category).
Figure 2: Study 2 Predicted Levels of Policy Support, by Experimental Condition
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Note: N = 137. Predicted values were calculated by holding control variables constant at 0 (i.e.,
each variable’s mean value or reference category).
Table 1: Network Neutrality Article (Main Body of Passage)
Network Neutrality and the Future of the Internet
By Samuel Johnson
Network Neutrality is at the center of an ongoing debate in Washington, pitting
major technology companies against one another. While few people have heard
of this issue, its outcome could drastically affect the future of the Internet. On
one side of the issue are telecommunications companies like AT&T and Verizon
that own the networks that make up the Internet. On the other side of the
debate are content providers like Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft that transmit
information over the Internet to their customers.
Recently, some of these content providers have begun offering services like
streaming videos and voice communication that take up a large amount of
a network’s overall capacity. Telecoms say that these data-intensive services
cause enormous stress on their networks that can lead to slower or dropped
Internet connections for their customers. To resolve this problem, telecoms
want to charge content providers a special fee to route video, voice, and other
large data streams more efficiently. Telecoms argue that these fees are neces-
sary to offset the rising costs of expanding and improving the infrastructure
of the Internet.
Content providers want Congress to pass Network Neutrality legislation to
prevent telecoms from charging them special fees based upon the type of data
that they transmit over the Internet. They argue that the prospect of telecoms
imposing new fees on innovative ventures is exactly the kind of thing that
deters online commerce.
Note: All subjects read the above paragraphs (245 words). The article concluded with the
experimental manipulation.
Table 2: Study 1 Regression Results
Variable Model I Model II
Experimental Condition 0.004 0.006
(0.041) (0.040)
Political Sophistication 0.128 0.264∗
(0.085) (0.105)
Condition X Sophistication — −0.333∗
(0.156)
Issue Familiarity 0.111 0.113†
(0.068) (0.067)
Computer Expertise −0.057 −0.064
(0.088) (0.087)
Computer Interest 0.191∗ 0.188∗
(0.083) (0.082)
Party ID 0.155† 0.185†
(0.092) (0.091)
Ideology 0.011 −0.011
(0.113) (0.112)
Female 0.029 0.028
(0.046) (0.045)
Non-White −0.075† −0.078†
(0.044) (0.044)
Intercept 0.592∗∗ 0.595∗∗
(0.039) (0.038)
R2 0.14 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.10
N 129 129
Note: The dependent variable is support for network neutrality. “Experimental Condition” is
dummy coded, where 1 = exposure to the metaphor and 0 = exposure to the literal equivalent.
All variables range from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. †p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 3: Study 2 Regression Results
Variable Model I Model II Model III
Attitude Quality Attitude
Literal Condition −0.140∗ −0.137∗ −0.036
(0.064) (0.057) (0.053)
Baseline Condition −0.170∗∗ — —
(0.060)
Message Quality — — 0.840∗∗
(0.107)
Political Sophistication 0.153† 0.225∗ −0.025
(0.092) (0.097) (0.091)
Education −0.044 −0.096 0.231∗
(0.093) (0.115) (0.104)
Issue Familiarity 0.150† 0.019 0.158†
(0.078) (0.090 (0.081)
Computer Expertise 0.168 0.036 0.060
(0.105) (0.135) (0.122)
Computer Interest 0.004 0.091 0.066
(0.126) (0.158) (0.142)
Party ID 0.108 0.007 0.012
(0.102) (0.107) (0.096)
Ideology −0.022 −0.056 −0.010
(0.121) (0.133) (0.120)
Female 0.058 −0.002 0.028
(0.057) (0.062) (0.055)
Non-White −0.062 −0.025 −0.107†
(0.067) (0.070) (0.063)
Intercept 0.611∗∗ 0.651∗∗ 0.099
(0.060) (0.058) (0.087)
R2 0.16 0.18 0.56
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.06 0.49
N 137 82 82
Note: The metaphor condition serves as the reference category for the literal and baseline
conditions. The baseline condition was excluded from the mediation analysis because subjects did
not receive supporting arguments; thus, they did not provide ratings of message quality. Sobel
statistic = −0.115, p < 0.05; total mediated effect = 76.25%; ratio of the indirect to direct effect
= 3.21. All variables range from 0 to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. †p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01.
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